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This paper develops and applies a new approach for analyzing the spatial aspects of 
individual adoption of a technology that produces a mixed public-private good.  The technology 
is an animal insecticide treatment called a “pouron” that individual households buy and apply to 
their animals.  Private benefits accrue to households whose animals are treated, while the public 
benefits accrue to all those who own animals within an area of effective suppression.   
A model of household demand for pourons is presented.  As for a private good, 
household demand for the variable input depends upon output price, input cost, and household 
characteristics.  Input costs for pouron treatments include both the market price of the pourons 
and the transaction costs that the household must incur to obtain the treatments.  Demand also 
depends upon the way that each household expects its neighbors to respond to one’s own 
behavior.  Free-riding is expected in communities with no tradition or formal organization to 
support collective action.  Greater cooperation is expected in communities that have 
organizations that reward cooperative behavior and punish deviant behavior. 
Data for estimation of the model were collected for all of the 5,000 households that 
reside within the study area of 350 square kilometers in southwest Ethiopia.  Geographic 
reference data were collected for every household using portable Geographic Positioning 
System units.  GIS software was used to generate spatial variables.  Variables for distance from 
the household to the nearest treatment center and number of cattle-owning neighbors within a 1-





used as a measure of the potential benefits from cooperation; this variable was expected to have 
a positive effect on household pouron demand in communities able to support effective 
collective action and a negative effect in communities not able to support effective collective 
action.  A set of community binary variables was interacted with the density variable to capture 
differences between communities.  The results confirm the importance of the household-level 
variables.  The results also indicate large differences in ability to cooperate between local 
administrative units.  Everything else equal, the areas least able to cooperate were located 
farthest from the treatment center, were ethnically heterogenous, and had a different ethnic 
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COLLECTIVE ACTION IN SPACE: 












1.    INTRODUCTION 
Economists are beginning to show more interest in the spatial aspects of economic 
relationships.  Spatial patterns of prices and land use have perhaps received most attention to 
date.  Jayne (1994) and Omamo (1995) have analyzed spatial patterns of crop choice in 
Zimbabwe and Kenya.  Bockstael (1996) studied spatial patterns of land use and land prices in 
the Patuxent Watershed in the state of Maryland.  Chomitx and Gray (1995) analyzed the 
spatial patterns of land use conversion resulting from road construction in Belize.  
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Collective action for natural resource management also has important spatial aspects.  
The location of individuals relative to each other and the collective good determines both the 
benefits and costs of collective action.  Consider, for example, a collective good available at a 
single fixed location, for example, a water well managed by collective.  Households located near 
to the well incur relatively low transaction costs to participate in the maintenance of the pump 
and low transaction costs to collect water from the well.  Households located near to the well, 
or near to roads leading to the well, could also incur relatively high costs from the disturbance 
caused by neighbors walking past.  Aggregate benefits and costs also depend upon the spatial 
distribution of individuals and resources.  The more densely populated the area served by the 
well, the lower the monitoring costs per individual, the greater the total transaction costs 
associated with queuing, and the greater the incentive to free-ride on others’ cooperative 
behavior.   
The focus in this paper is on individual adoption of a technology that produces a mixed 
public-private good.  The technology is a formulation of insecticide called that is applied to 
cattle as a “pouron”. The mixed public-private good is control of external parasites and animal 
disease vectors.  Household demand for pourons is hypothesized to depend upon three spatial 
factors:  (1) distance from the household to the place where the cattle treatments are sold; (2) 
density of cattle owners in the neighborhood around each household; and (3) ability of the local 
administrative unit to foster collective action.  Distance to the treatment center determines 





affects both the opportunities for collective action and the incentives to free-ride on neighbors’ 
use of the cattle treatments.  The ability of the local administrative unit to foster collective action 
determines the incentives to free-ride or cooperate in provision of the public good.   
Those hypotheses are tested through an analysis of individual use of cattle treatments in 
a study site in the Ghibe Valley of Ethiopia.  The behavior of individual households regarding the 
use of cattle treatments is related to the characteristics of the households themselves and the 
characteristics of their neighbors.  Neighbor variables are created using Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS) software and brought into a logistical regression model.  
The next section provides some background on the technical and economic aspects of 
the problem and the particular case study.  Section 3 presents a model of household demand for 
pouron treatments.  That model provides a mathematical definition of the three spatial 
dimensions of demand for the mixed public-private good.  Section 4 discusses the methods 
used to collect, process and analyze household-level census data.  The econometric results are 
presented in Section 5.  The econometric results led to a subsequent qualitative study of the 
ability of local communities to cooperate in the use of the pourons.  Both the methods and 
results of that phase of the research are described in Section 6.  Section 7 is a discussion and 





INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR TSETSE CONTROL BY USE OF 
POURONS 
Background 
African animal trypanosomosis is an animal disease that constrains livestock productivity 
and agricultural development across much of sub-Saharan Africa. Trypanosomosis is caused by 
parasitic protozoa and transmitted by several specie of tsetse fly (Glossina spp.).  
Trypanosomosis is particularly important in Ethiopia where about 7 million cattle are at risk of 
contracting the disease and cattle are the main source of traction for crop cultivation. 
Since January 1991 the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) has been 
conducting a tsetse control trial using a cypermethrin high-cis pouron (ECTOPOR, Ciba-Geigy, 
Switzerland) in the Ghibe Valley (Gullele area) of Southwest Ethiopia (Leak et al. 1995; 
Swallow et al. 1995).  Most cattle owners in the Ghibe Valley are sedentary agropastoralists 
who rely heavily on cattle for the production of traction power.  Indeed, 51 percent of all cattle 
in the area are oxen, that is, male animals over the age of five years whose primary purpose is to 
provide traction power.  Most cattle are grazed in village herds of less than 100 cattle.  Village 
herds are formed each morning in the village area, and then taken to graze on fallow land and 
crop residues within two-four kilometers of the village.  Other research conducted by the 
authors shows that there is relatively little overlap between the grazing territories used by 
communal herds.  Individual households have use rights to land, with the local government unit 





In the pouron trial, a solution of insecticide is applied directly to cattle as a pouron.  
Tsetse flies and other external parasites that attempt to feed on the treated animals contact the 
insecticide and die.  The pouron treatments were cost free until December 1992 when a cost 
recovery scheme was introduced. Thereafter individual cattle owners have been charged 3 
Ethiopian Birr (about US$ 0.50) for each animal treated (Swallow et al. 1995).  Any farmer 
who wishes to have animals treated can present their animals at one of the nine treatment 
centers where ILRI makes the pourons available one day each month.  Figure 1 is a map of the 
study site. 
THE PRIVATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC BENEFITS OF POURON USE 
Previous studies in the Ghibe Valley show that farmers perceive three main benefits 
from use of the pouron: (i) less trypanosomosis in cattle; (ii) fewer problems with biting flies; and 
(iii) fewer problems with ticks (Swallow et al., 1995).  Leak et al. (1995) have confirmed these 
perceptions: use of the pouron was associated with large reductions in trypanosomosis 
prevalence in cattle and in the relative densities of 3 species of tsetse and 2 species of biting 
flies.  Farmers who treat their cattle with pourons obtain private benefits.  Animals that receive 
treatments carry fewer ticks and may receive fewer bites from tsetse and other biting flies.  
Private treatment of animals with the pourons also generates local public benefits, namely 
suppression of the numbers of tsetse and other biting and nuisance flies in the local area.  Given 





tsetse suppression in one location likely accrue to people keeping cattle within a 1-kilometer 
radius of that location (Leak, personal communication, 1997). 
 






























































Pourons are thus described in economic terms as mixed public-private goods or impure 
public goods (Cornes and Sandler 1986).  Individual farmers will purchase pouron treatments 
on the basis of their expectations of the marginal costs, marginal private benefits and marginal 
benefit from the public good.  The marginal costs will be of two types:  (i) cash cost of the 
treatment (standard cost of 3 Ethiopian Birr or $0.50 per animal treated) and (ii) transaction 
costs associated with procurement of the treatments.  A priori, we assumed that transaction 
costs would be completely determined by distance from the homestead to the treatment center. 
  
The marginal private benefit will depend upon the productivity effects of biting flies and 
ticks and the efficacy of the pourons in alleviating those effects.  The public good benefit will 
depend upon the strength of the local institutions governing pouron use and the way that 
neighbors are expected to respond to changes in others’ behavior.  A priori, we assumed that 
these expectations would vary from one Kabele to another.  Kabeles are the lowest level of 
government administration in rural Ethiopia and are responsible for a wide range of public 
services and local organization.  Farmers from 23 Kabeles obtain pouron treatments at the nine 
treatment centers (see Figure 1).  Kabeles contain an average of 200-250 households.   
 
2.    A MODEL OF HOUSEHOLD DEMAND FOR POURON TREATMENTS 
This section presents a model of household demand for pourons that considers the 





keeping for individual i as the difference between expected revenues and costs.  We assume 
that livestock producers will choose the level of pouron use (Poi) that maximizes profits.  
Revenues are defined as the product of an aggregate product price (P) and the productive 
capacity of individual i’s cattle herd (Hi).  The productive capacity of a herd is a function of the 
number of cattle in the herd (Li), the composition of the herd, the level of pouron use by 
individual i (Qi), the expected level of pouron use by others who raise livestock in the area (QJ 
= n Qj\i) and the attributes of the herd owner.  Two variables were used to measure herd 
composition: LOi is the proportion of oxen in the herd and LCi is the proportion of cows in the 
herd.  Age and gender of the household head were the two attributes of the herd owner that 
were considered.  Herd size (Li) and herd composition (LOi, LCi) are assumed to be quasi-
fixed assets that are unaffected by pouron use in the short term.  Thus the only costs associated 
with the pouron use are the costs of the pourons themselves (c) and the transaction costs 
associated with the pouron treatments (ti).  Here it is assumed that the costs of the pourons are 
constant for all individuals, while transaction costs vary across individuals.  A priori, we assume 
that the main determinant of transaction costs is distance from the homestead to the treatment 
center (ti(di)).  
 
  ð  i = E [P * Hi (Qi, QJ; Li, LOi, LCi, Agei, Sexi)] - (c + ti(di)) * Qi  (1) 
Differentiation of equation (1) with respect to Qi produces the first order condition given by 





derived is given by equation (4).  We assume that the function H is concave and continuously 
differentiable. 
 
  ä   ð  i / ä Qi = E [ P (ä H/ ä Qi + (ä H/ ä Qj) * (ä Qj/ ä Qi)] - c - ti = 0  (2) 
 
  ä   ð  i / ä Qi = P ä H/ ä Qi + P ä H/ ä Qj E (ä Q/ ä Qi) - c - ti = 0  (3) 
 
  Qi
D = f (P, c, ti, ä H/ ä Qi, ä H/ ä Qj * E (ä Qj/ ä Qi); Li, LOi, LCi, Agei, Sexi)  (4) 
 
The expected signs of five of the variables follow from the standard model of variable 
input demand: (1) ä Qi
D / ä P > 0—demand is increasing in the price of the aggregate output; 
(2) ä Qi
D / ä c < 0—demand is decreasing in the cost of the pouron; (3) ä Qi
D / ä ti < 0—
demand is decreasing in transaction costs; (4) ä Qi
D / (ä H/ ä Qi) >0—demand is increasing in 
the marginal contribution of the pouron to herd productivity; and (5) ä Qi
D / ä Li >0—demand is 
increasing in herd size.  The expected signs on both of the herd structure variables, ä Qi
D / ä 
LOi and ä Qi
D / ä LCi, are positive since oxen and cows are the most preferred age-sex 
cohorts in the cattle herds.  This hypothesis is supported by the earlier analysis by Swallow et al. 
(1995).  ä Qi
D / ä Agei is expected to be positive since the pouron is a risk-reducing input and 
households whose heads are older are expected to be more risk averse.  ä Qi
D / ä Sexi (Sexi = 
1 if the household head is male and 2 if the household head is female) is also expected to be 
positive since female-headed households are expected to be more risk averse.  This hypothesis 
is supported by the findings of Echessah et al. (1997) that female-headed households in the 
Busia area of Kenya were willing to contribute a significantly higher proportion of their income 





collective action is (ä H/ ä Qj * E ( ä Qj/ ä Qi).  We assume that ä H/ ä QJ is always positive: 
the marginal benefits derived from additional units of the pouron are positive for all relevant 
levels of pouron use.  E (ä Qj/ ä Qi) may be positive or negative.  With no cooperation between 
neighbors, E  (ä Qj / ä Qi) would be negative.  That is, individual i would expect his/her 
neighbors to free-ride on their use of the pouron by reducing their own level of use.  The more 
pouron used by i, the less pouron used by i’s neighbors.  This free-rider effect might be 
dampened, or even reversed, however, if there is some type of collective action to support 
collective action among farmers.  In such a case E (ä Qj/ ä Qi) might be positive.  That is, the 
more pouron used by i, the more pouron used by i’s neighbors.  We therefore re-define E( ä 
QJ/ ä Qi) as ë i, the index of expected cooperation held by individual i.  Following the 
discussion in Section 2.2, we hypothesize that ë i ￿will vary from Kabele to Kabele. 
 
3.    DATA COLLECTION, GENERATION AND ANALYSIS 
GEO-REFERENCED HOUSEHOLD CENSUS 
A geo-referenced census of all households in the ‘market shed’ of the 9 supply points 
for the pouron was undertaken between March and July 1996.  Administration of the census 
questionnaire began with the villages immediately adjacent to the supply points and moved from 
village to village in all directions away from the distribution points until the enumerators came to 





be within the market shed if more than 2 households in the village reported having cattle treated 
with pourons during the previous year.  A village was judged to be outside of the market shed if 
less than 2 households reported having cattle treated during the previous year.   
The census questionnaire was prepared in English, translated into Amharic, pre-tested 
with 20 households, modified, and administered by enumerators during personal interviews with 
household heads.  The census questionnaire was brief and took an average of 10 minutes to 
administer to each household.  Data were collected on livestock ownership, use of pouron 
treatments, crop production and migration.  Almost all of the questions were pre-coded closed-
ended questions.  Enumerators carried portable global positioning system (GPS) units and 
recorded the longitude and latitude co-ordinates for each household.   
GENERATION OF NEIGHBOR AND NEIGHBORHOOD VARIABLES USING GIS 
After translation into English, all data were entered using Visual Dbase (Borland, 1995) 
and verified in SPSS 6.1 (Norusis 1994).  Data were then moved into PCARC/INFO (ESRI, 
1996) GIS software, for creation of the spatial variables.  The PCARC/INFO POINTDIST 
command was used to create a Point Attribute Table (PAT) file on neighbors in the 1-kilometer 
radius neighborhood.  Microsoft FoxPro Version 3.0b (Kennamer, 1995) was used to sort the 
PAT data file created by the POINTDIST command and to generate attribute data on 
neighbors within a radius of 1 kilometer of each household.  The NEAR command was used to 





map the locations of households and treatment centers.  The augmented data set was then 
brought into SPSS for econometric analysis. 
In this analysis we relate the behavior of households to the characteristics of neighbors 
within a 1-kilometer radius.  The 1-kilometer radius was chosen for two reasons.  First, group 
interviews show that farmers appreciate the fact most of the benefits of tsetse suppression in a 
particular location will accrue within 3-4 km
2 of that location (Stephen Leak, personal 
communication, 1997).  Second, people are able to easily monitor the tsetse control actions of 
households located within 1 kilometer of their homesteads.  Farmers likely interact less with 
neighbors living more than 1 kilometer away.  
A LOGISTICAL MODEL OF POURON DEMAND 
Equation (4) specifies a general version of the pouron demand function.  In the empirical 
analysis we have focused on the probability that a household treated some of their animals with 
pouron during the previous wet season.  While there were direct measures for most of the 
household-level variables that would affect that probability, an instrumental variable needed to 
be constructed to represent collective action (or collective inaction in the case of non-
cooperation).  As a measure of the effects of others’ pouron use on the productive capacity of 
the individual household (ä H / ä QJ), we use the number of cattle-owning households within a 
1-kilometer radius.  The higher the number of cattle-owning households in that area, the greater 
the potential gains from cooperation in pouron use and also the greater the incentive to free-ride 





A priori, we hypothesized that the degree of cooperation or non-cooperation (E(ä Qj / 
ä Qi)) would depend upon the Kabele in which the household is located.  That is, the demand 
of households living in Kabeles with low cooperation would be negatively influenced by the 
density of cattle-owning households, while the demand of households living in Kabeles with high 
cooperation would be positively influenced by the density of cattle-owning households.  In 
Ethiopia, the Kabele is the smallest unit of local administration and the smallest socio-political 
unit whose boundaries are fixed.  While there are other social-spatial units that affect 
cooperation, none are observed across the study area, none are mutually exclusive, and none 
have fixed boundaries. 
Binary variables were created to represent the 23 Kabeles in which the households 
were located.  The population density and Kabele variables were multiplied together to create a 
set of 23 new variables, CGNL = CGNL1, CGNL2, ..., CGNL23, measuring the gains from 
cooperation or loss from non-cooperation.  CGNL stands for cooperation gain or non-
cooperation loss.  For each household 22 of the 23 variables were equal to zero and one was 
equal to the number of households within the 1km radius around the household.  A negative sign 
on a CGNL variable will indicate that households in that Kabele were generally less likely to 
treat their own animals when they had more cattle-owning neighbors.  A negative sign indicates 
a group that did not overcome the incentives for free-riding.  A positive sign on the CGNL 





animals when they had more cattle-owning neighbors.  A positive sign indicates a group that 
was able to overcome the incentives for free-riding. 
A logistical regression model was estimated to investigate factors affecting the 
probability that a household treated any cattle with pourons during the previous wet season.  A 
Heckman’s two-step model will also be estimated in future studies in order to test hypotheses 
about factors affecting the level of demand.  Given space limitations here, however, we focus on 
the probability that a household treated any cattle. 
Five versions of the logistical regression model were estimated. Version 1 included only 
characteristics of the household and its herd.  The explanatory variables included age of 
household head, sex of household head, total number of cattle held, proportion of herd that was 
oxen, and proportion of herd that was cows.  Version 2 included those household and herd 
characteristics and a variable measuring distance from the household to the nearest treatment 
center.  Version 3 considered household and herd characteristics, distance to the nearest 
treatment center, and the 23 variables that measure the gains from cooperation or losses from 
non-cooperation.  Version 4 was the same as Version 3, with the addition of 8 binary variables 
to allow for differences between the 9 treatment centers (crushes).  None of those crush 
variables was statistically significant.  Version 5 was the same as Version 3, plus 23 more 
variables to capture possible interactions between Kabele and distance to the treatment center. 
  Probi=f (household attributes—age and sex of the household head  (5) 
 






distance to the treatment center—including the square to allow for diminishing marginal costs 
associated with distance; 
 
composite variables of number of animals in 1km radius and Kabele binary variables—CGNL1, 
CGN2, ... CGNL23). 
 
 
4.    STATISTICAL RESULTS 
About 5,000 households were enumerated during the census, two-thirds of which 
owned cattle (3,267).  The average cattle-owning household held 4.7 cattle at the time of the 
survey, 51% of which were oxen and 17% of which were cows.  Ten percent of cattle-owning 
households were headed by women.  Ninety percent were headed by men.  Seventy percent of 
cattle owners treated some cattle during the previous wet season (June-August 1995), 46% 
treated some cattle during the dry season, 44% treated some cattle during both the dry and wet 
season, and 1.6% treated some cattle during the dry season only. 
The average cattle-owning household in the area was located 2.5 km from the nearest 
treatment center and had 53 cattle-owning neighbors within a 1-kilometer radius.  Neighbors of 
the average cattle-owning household treated 59 cattle during the previous dry season and 102 
cattle during the previous wet season.  The average household owned 3.8% of all cattle within 
the 1km radius of their household.  There was large variation in these spatial variables between 
households.  One household had 143 cattle-owning neighbors within a 1-kilometer radius; 
others had no cattle-owning neighbors within a 1-kilometer radius.  Some households resided in 





season and 240 cattle were treated during the previous dry season.  Other households resided 
in places where no other cattle were treated within a 1-kilometer radius in the previous dry 
season or wet season (Table 1). 
Households in the market-shed of the 9 treatment centers resided in 23 Kabeles.  The 
average Kabele had 142 cattle-owning households and 216 total households.  Kabeles ranged 
in size from 27 to 317 households.  
Several findings stand out from the results of the logistical regression model of wet-season 
demand presented in Table 2.  First, neither the age nor sex of the household head were 
significant in any of the models.  Second, the coefficients on the herd size and herd structure 
variables were significant in all versions of the model (p < 0.001).  The relative size of the 
estimated coefficients indicate that large holdings of oxen are more likely to prompt farmers to 
treat some animals than equally large holdings of cows. Third, the results from Version 2 of the 
model indicate a significant non-linear relationship between distance to the crush and the 
probability that a household treated any animals.  The finding that the probability of treatment 
actually increases for some distance, then decreases, might indicate that the relationship is non-
linear but poorly represented by the quadratic, since the coefficient for the squared distance is 
non-significant.  It might also indicate that proximity to the crush provides people with a stronger 






Table 1  Descriptive statistics on household population included in household census 
(data for 3,267 cattle-owning households) 
Variable name deviation  Mean  Standard  Minimum  Maximum 
Use of pourons 
–proportion households in dry season  0.46 
–proportion households in wet season   0.70 
–cattle treated in dry season   1.38  1.95  0  25 
–cattle treated in wet season  2.16  2.36  0  30 
Household characteristics 
–Age (years)  41.50  14.60  16  111 
–Sex (1=m, 2=f)  1.10  0.30  1  2 
Herd characteristics 
–number cattle  4.70  4.60  1  56 
–proportion oxen  0.51  0.36  0  1 
–proportion cows  0.17  0.20  0  1 
Distance  
–Kilometers to crush  2.50  3.10  0  19.8 
Neighbor traits 








Table 2  Results for versions 1, 2 and 3 of the model of pouron demand, estimated for 3,221 cattle-owning households in the Ghibe 
Valley of Ethiopia 
Variable  Version 1    Version 2    Version 3 
  Coef.  P-value    Coef.  P-value    Coef.  P-value 
                 
Constant  -.8919  .0000    -.2936  .0000    -1.3841  .0000 
Household traits                 
–age of hh head  .0006  .8336    .0013  .6520    .0013  .6644 
–sex of hh head  -.1135  .3881    .0247  .8538    -.0319  .8253 
Herd traits                 
–number cattle  .1889   .0000    .1820  .0000    .1858  .0000 
–proportion oxen  1.8617  .0000     1.7873  .0000    1.8571  .0000 
–proportion cows  .7935  .0006    .8185  .0004    1.1066  .0000 
                 
Distance                  
–meters        .0003  .0000    7.6E-5  .0750 
–meters squared        -.2E-8  .0000    -3.0E-9  .4829 
                 
Kab1*cattle hhs in 1km              .0188  .0002 
Kab2*cattle hhs in 1km              -.0002  .9641 
Kab3*cattle hhs in 1km              .0152  .0042 
Kab4*cattle hhs in 1km              .0070  .0358 
Kab5*cattle hhs in 1km              -.2441  .0000 
Kab6*cattle hhs in 1km              -.0077  .1657 
Kab7*cattle hhs in 1km              -.0050  .4738 
Kab8*cattle hhs in 1km              -.0994  .0008 





                 
                 
Table 2  Results for versions 1, 2 and 3 of the model of pouron demand, estimated for 3,221 cattle-owning 
households in the Ghibe Valley of Ethiopia (continued) 
Variable  Version 1    Version 2    Version 3 
  Coef.  P-value    Coef.  P-value    Coef.  P-value 
                 
Kab10*cattle hhs in 1km              -.0268  .0000 
Kab11*cattle hhs in 1km              -.0046  .2353 
Kab12*cattle hhs in 1km              .0071  .0171 
Kab13*cattle hhs in 1km              -.0170  .0000 
Kab14*cattle hhs in 1km              -.0072  .0000 
Kab15*cattle hhs in 1km              -.0135  .0435 
Kab16*cattle hhs in 1km              .0072  .0072 
Kab17*cattle hhs in 1km              .0177  .0012 
Kab18*cattle hhs in 1km              .0165  .0001 
Kab19*cattle hhs in 1km              .0459  .0000 
Kab20*cattle hhs in 1km              .0030  .7334 
Kab21*cattle hhs in 1km              .0053  .4043 
Kab22*cattle hhs in 1km              -.0145  .0000 
Kab23*cattle hhs in 1km              -.0130  .0000 
Chi-square  367.8    410.6  804.1 








Results from Version 3 of the model indicate large differences between Kabeles in their 
ability to capitalize on the gains from cooperation or suffer losses due to non-cooperation.  The 
estimated coefficients on the CGNL variables were negative for about half of the Kabeles, 
indicating overall free-riding behavior, and positive for the other half, indicating overall 
cooperative behavior.  Seven of the negative coefficients are statistically significant at p < 0.001, 
three of the positive coefficients are statistically significant at p < 0.001.  It would appear that in 
the remaining 13 Kabeles the incentive to free ride was roughly offset by incentive to cooperate. 
  
Another intriguing result from Version 3 of the model is that the distance variables were 
statistically insignificant, in contrast to the results from Version 2.  This suggests that the distance 
variables were capturing the effects of the cooperation variables in Version 2, so that their 
significance disappeared when the cooperation variables were included in Version 3.  
Apparently distance had important effects on the ability to cooperate, but no other effect on 
household demand.  
Version 4 of the model included all of the same variables as Version 3, plus an 
additional 8 binary variables to allow for differences between the 9 treatment centers.  None of 
those binary variables were significant.  Version 5 of the model was the same as Version 3, with 
23 more variables included to capture possible interactions between Kabele and distance to the 





Figure 2 illustrates these results on a map of the Kabeles in the study area.  The 
Kabeles indicated by vertical hatched lines have positive coefficients on the ability-to- 
cooperate variable.  The 3 Kabeles with the narrowly-spaced vertical lines have significant 
positive coefficients, while the 9 Kabeles with the widely-spaced vertical lines have insignificant 
positive coefficients.  On the other hand, Kabeles indicated by horizontal lines have negative 
coefficients on the ability-to-cooperate variable.  The 4 Kabeles indicated with widely-spaced 
horizontal lines have insignificant negative coefficients, and the 7 Kabeles indicated with 
narrowly-spaced horizontal lines have significant negative coefficients.   
The spatial distribution of the 4 types of Kabeles indicates that the ability of the Kabele 
to cooperate is at least partially related to distance from the treatment centers.  Kabeles with 
low cooperative abilities tend to be on the peripheries of the overall study area, while Kabeles 
with high cooperative abilities tend to be in the center of the area.  Three clusters of Kabeles 
suggest that there are other important factors at play.  In the south-west of the study area, there 
are 4 neighboring Kabeles with the different levels of cooperative ability, despite the fact that all 
are located near to treatment centers.  There are similar clusters of Kabeles in the south-east 
















5.    GROUP INTERVIEWS: WHAT CAUSED DIFFERENCES IN COOPERATION? 
The results from Version 3 of the model indicate significant differences between 
Kabeles in their abilities to foster cooperation in pouron use among neighbors.  These results 
raise additional questions.  First, do the results capture real differences in cooperation or some 
other phenomena that is only statistically related?  Second, are Kabeles important in their own 
right, as assumed a priori, or are Kabeles spatially correlated with some more important social 
groupings?  Third, why is it more difficult to undertake collective action in Kabeles close to the 
treatment centers than in Kabeles further away from the treatment centers? 
Follow-up research was conducted to answer those questions.  Results from the 
econometric analysis were used to select three pairs of Kabeles.  Each pair included one 
Kabele with a high ability to cooperate and another nearby Kabele with a low ability to 
cooperate.  In the southwest part of the study area, Wayu Wedessa was selected as an area of 
low cooperation and Bosso Dire was selected as an area of high cooperation.  In the southeast 
part of the study area, Mitare Hebeni was selected as an area of low cooperation and Bilo 
Mero as an area of high cooperation.  And in the northern part of the study area, Metu Selassie 
was selected as an area of low cooperation and Bilo Metele as an area of high cooperation.  
Interviews were held in each of the 6 Kabeles during a 3-day period in February 1998.  
Between 5 and 30 livestock owners participated in each group interview.  About 10-12 open-
ended questions were asked during interviews lasting 1 to 2 hours.  Participation in the group 





livestock owners attended the group interviews in the low cooperation villages.  Twenty to thirty 
livestock owners attended the group interviews in the high cooperation villages. 
The results provided answers to the three questions posed above.  The econometric 
results were indeed consistent with large differences in actual cooperation between the Kabeles. 
 All three Kabeles that were identified through the econometric analysis as having low ability to 
cooperate did indeed report low levels of pouron use and little or no active collective action to 
support pouron use.  Alternatively, the three Kabeles that were identified as having high ability 
to cooperate indeed reported much higher levels of pouron use and very active collective action 
at the level of the Kabele.  
Examples of active and deliberate cooperation were found in the Kabeles identified 
through the statistical analysis as having high ability to cooperate.  For example, the livestock 
owners and Kabele officials that we interviewed in Bilo Metele reported several forms of active 
cooperation, most of which was led by the Kabele officials:  1) People in the Kabele have 
formed groups for disseminating information about upcoming meetings and important events.  
The head of each group is a contact point for receiving information and he is responsible for 
disseminating the information to other group members.  Information about the dates when 
pouron treatments are available is disseminated through these groups.  2) People help each 
other by taking each other’s animals to the treatment center.  They do this despite the difficulties 
of handling others’ animals in strange places.  3) The Chairman of the Kabele has met with 





the crush where treatments are available.  4) A village of recent immigrants who live farther 
away from the crush are allowed to graze their animals around the village en route to getting 
treatments.   
In contrast, in Wayu Wedessa, farmers interviewed during the group interview were 
ready to admit that they had deliberately discouraged their neighbors from receiving pouron 
treatments.  Their logic was this:  if they told their neighbor that pouron treatments will be 
available on a certain day, that neighbor will ask them to take their animals when they go.  The 
strange animals may be difficult to handle and cause crop damage along the way. 
An answer to the second question is supported by both the econometric analysis and 
the group interviews.  In Version 4 of the model none of the coefficients on the treatment center 
binary variables was significant, implying that cattle owners do not group around the treatment 
centers.  The groups of farmers interviewed in the three Kabeles with high levels of cooperation 
mentioned examples of collective action at the Kabele level, but did not mention examples of 
collective action for pouron use around any other social group.  This suggests that the Kabele is 
a locus of collective action for tsetse control in some of the areas.  No other social group was 
identified as playing that role. 
The group interviews also provided a possible answer to the third question about the 
reasons why it appears to be more difficult to sustain collective action in Kabeles farther from 
the treatment center?  The types of collective action that the farmer groups mentioned involve 





treatments will be available is costly.  Taking neighbors’ animals to and from the treatment 
centers is costly.  Maintaining a clear walking path through intensively-used farmland is also 
costly.  All of these transaction costs are positively related to distance to the treatment centers.  
The greater the distance, the higher the transaction costs associated with cooperation, and thus 
the less likely was cooperation.   
Transaction costs are also positively related to ethnic heterogeneity.  We propose two 
hypotheses that are consistent with this result.  First, the greater the ethnic heterogeneity within a 
Kabele, the greater the transaction costs associated with collective action.  This is consistent 
with both theory and other case study evidence (see Baland and Platteau, 1994).  Second, the 
greater the ethnic difference between the Kabele that hosts a treatment center and another 
outlying Kabele, the greater the transaction costs associated with the collective action in the 
outlying Kabele.  Two of the non-cooperative Kabeles were populated by mixtures of Oromo-
speaking and Amhara-speaking people, while the third was mostly populated by Oromo 
speakers.  The pattern of settlement in the study area is such that all of the crushes are located in 
areas where Amharic-speaking persons predominate.  Because they don’t interact as freely with 
Amhara speakers, the Oromo speakers had to bear more costs in order to obtain information 
about the treatment dates.  In addition, Oromo speakers do not feel welcome to walk their 
animals through the Amhara areas en route to the crushes or to wait around the crushes to have 





6.    DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
THE CASE STUDY 
Several of the results from the case study warrant further discussion.  Consider first the 
result that the gender of the household head has no effect on the probability that a household will 
give pouron treatments to its animals.  This result is consistent with an earlier analysis of pouron 
demand in the Ghibe Valley that found no household characteristics to have significant effects on 
pouron demand (Swallow et al. 1995).  It appears inconsistent, however, with the findings of 
Echessah et al. (1997) that female-headed households in the Busia District of Kenya were 
willing to contribute significantly more money to tsetse control than male-headed households.  
The differences may be due in part to the difference in disease risk.  Both people and livestock 
are at risk of contracting trypanosomosis in Busia, while in Ghibe only livestock are at risk.  In 
both sites men have primary responsible for animal health, while women have primary 
responsible for family health. 
The results from Version 3 of the model indicate significant differences between 
Kabeles in their abilities to foster cooperation in pouron use among neighbors.  The group 
interviews conducted in the three pairs of Kabeles confirmed these findings and provided three 
important insights.  First, Kabeles are an important locus of cooperation even though Kabeles 
were not formally involved in the control program.  Second, cooperation is costly.  It is costly to 
acquire and exchange information and both costly and risky to move animals to the treatment 





likelihood of successful cooperation.  Differences in ethnicity and distance to the treatment 
center increase those costs. 
The pilot tsetse control trial was changed in two ways because of the insights obtained 
from this study.  First, two new treatment centers were opened in low cooperation areas that 
are mostly populated by Oromo speaking people.  This should make the treatments more easily 
accessible to Oromo-speaking people in the area and increase cooperation.  Second, the dates 
when pouron treatments will be given are now announced at least a month in advance.  This 
should make information more easily and cheaply available.  These lessons will extend to other 
locations where this approach to pouron delivery and utilization is attempted. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMICS OF SPACE 
Several things about this study distinguish it from most other studies of economic 
behavior and economic activity in developing countries.  First, the large number of observations 
(5,000 households, two thirds of which owned cattle) allowed more accurate estimation of 
parameters than is usual.  The costs per household of data collection and data processing were 
very low because there were no costs associated with sampling (e.g. compilation of an accurate 
sampling frame, location of selected households) and because the questionnaire was very 
focused.  
Second, the large number of observations allowed the accurate estimation of the 





variables, over half of which were statistically significant at p < 0.001.  Two additional versions 
of the model, not shown here, were run with several more variables.   
Third, the geo-referenced census yielded information about all of the neighbors of every 
household.  Manipulation of the census data with the GIS tools allowed the creation of the 
neighbor variables and the tests of hypotheses about ability to cooperate.  This approach could 
be extended to the many other types of economic behavior and economic outcomes that are 
related to space.  In this case, this approach was possible because of close contact and 
collaboration between economists and geographers and the availability of computer software 
and hardware for GIS and econometric analysis. 
Fourth, the geo-referencing of the census data allowed us to create several new spatial 
data layers that can be used for other purposes.  For example, we now know the location of all 
households in our study area, the year that they established their homestead in its present 
location, and from where they originated.   Those data are being used to estimate the temporal 
and spatial patterns of in-migration into the study area and the effects of tsetse and 
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